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1 Cuba and the United States entered a new chapter of their longstanding contentious
relationship  when President  Barack Obama and President  Raul  Castro  announced on
December 17, 2014 their agreement to embark on the path of “normalization”. It was,
first and foremost, a symbolic and emotional gesture to move beyond the era of direct
hostilities toward constructive engagement. Moreover, their decision to move ahead with
pragmatic dialogue and cooperation on matters of mutual interest opened the door to
long-overdue diplomatic talks on a host of relatively straightforward matters as well as
more vexing issues like property claims and human rights.
2 Despite significant progress made during the last two years of the Obama administration,
the most difficult obstacles to normalized relations are still in place – a five-decade plus
comprehensive embargo that under current U.S. law must remain in place until Cuba
adopts major democratic reforms, and the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuban
sovereignty. With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, Republican control
of the Congress and a risk-averse Castro-led regime in power in Havana, all signs point to
stalemate at best, and significant backsliding at worst.
3 To understand better the motives and interests shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba in the
last five years, this article analyzes progress toward normalization to date and the main
U.S. protagonists in this unfolding drama. It starts by discussing the U.S. domestic forces
that have coalesced around the new policy and their specific but common interests in a
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relaxed  and  more  open  bilateral  relationship.  It  then  catalogues  some  key  areas  of
greatest  interest  to  those  constituencies  and  how  they  may  benefit  from  them.  It
examines the initial steps of the Trump administration to roll back aspects of the Obama
engagement strategy and their likely effects. On balance, it concludes that the key factors
that have shaped U.S.-Cuba détente to date –commercial and economic opportunities,
generational change, and security interests – in the longer term will likely continue to
encourage forward progress in resolving one of the last vestiges of the Cold War, albeit in
fits and starts. This more optimistic outcome, however, is by no means guaranteed and
will depend greatly on the results of U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020.
 
U.S. Constituencies for Normalization
4 After years of dominating U.S.-Cuba policy by hardline Cuban-American exiles in Florida,
the Obama administration entered the White House in 2009 determined to turn the page
toward  constructive  engagement  through  executive  action  and  direct  negotiation  of
renewed diplomatic ties. This was a political calculation by President Obama to satisfy
constituencies  within the Democratic  Party long in favor of  reducing hostilities  with
Havana; it was also a gamble that he could win over Cuban American voters in the critical
swing state of Florida opposed to Bush-era rules that interfered with sending remittances
and traveling to visit family on the island. Prominent Cuban-American business leaders
were also on record in favor of relaxing ties to Cuba as it began to open the doors to
foreign investment as part of its own internal process of economic and social reforms to
“perfect” the Cuban socialist system. Winning over these constituencies was enough for
Obama to make good on his campaign promise to relax rules for travel and remittances
for Cuban Americans shortly after he took office in early 2009.
5 The bigger bet – a strategic shift from the policy of isolation and regime change codified
under U.S. law in 1996 to a more flexible policy of mutual respect and cooperation –
required a more diverse coalition of stakeholders to support and sustain it. The early
rounds of regulatory changes during Obama’s first term helped generate more interest
among a wide range of elite opinion leaders and the general public in getting to know
Cuba better and thereby put pressure on the administration itself and on the Congress to
relax the embargo further. These interest groups included:
• leading  business  groups  from  the  travel,  hospitality,  agriculture,  health,
telecommunications and construction industries;
• top-ranking journalists and news companies anxious to break into Cuba’s restrictive media
environment;
• establishment think tanks, philanthropies and civil society organizations such as the Council
on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Washington Office
on Latin America, the Ford Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies and the Americas Society/
Council of the Americas;
• academics  anxious  to  explore research partnerships  and universities  keen to  offer  their
students more compelling study abroad opportunities;
• environmentalists excited about Cuba’s relatively pristine and protected ecosystem;
• religious groups inspired by calls from Popes John Paul I and II,  Benedict and Francis to
support and unite the Cuban family, and by Cubans’ revitalized religiosity; 
• military and law enforcement officials eager to work with Cuba’s security forces to protect
U.S. borders from drugs and migrants;
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• diplomats – U.S. and foreign – who saw first hand how the U.S. embargo mainly served to
help  the  Castros  rally  domestic  and  international  solidarity  against  the  “imperialist
Yankees”; and
• artists, musicians and museums long drawn to Cuba’s thriving cultural scene.
6 While these groups took advantage of the Obama administration’s initial steps to relax
travel restrictions, they were stymied by the high costs and red tape associated with
doing  anything  constructive  under  a  system  strangled  by  thousands  of  rules  and
micromanagement on both sides of the Florida Straits. Their efforts to get traction were
further  hampered  by  Cuba’s  arrest  in  December  2009  of  Alan  Gross,  an  American
contractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development engaged in helping Cubans
access satellite technology in violation of Cuban law. The White House retreated into a
holding pattern while it tried through various means to get Gross released.
7 The  dam  broke  when  President  Obama  and  President  Raul  Castro  announced  on
December 17, 2014 (known popularly as D17) a plan to normalize relations between the
two countries. In a dramatic and emotional turning of the page, the two presidents also
arranged for Gross and an imprisoned U.S. intelligence asset to fly home in exchange for
three Cuban spies, and the launch of an intensive renewal of diplomatic relations.
 
Diplomatic Relations
8 The two presidents met in person in April 2015 at the Summit of the Americas in Panama,
the  first  time  Cuba  was  invited  to  the  premiere  gathering  of  heads  of  state  and
government  from every  country  of  the  region.  Diplomatic  relations  with  Cuba  were
officially re-established on July 20, 2015 when the U.S. embassy in Havana and the Cuban
embassy in Washington, D.C. re-opened after decades of disengagement. When John Kerry
went  to  Havana  for  the  U.S.  Embassy’s  flag-raising  ceremony  on  August  14,  2015,
accompanied by a high-ranking congressional, business and Cuban-American delegation,
he became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Cuba in 70 years. President Obama
became the first U.S. President to visit Cuba in almost 90 years when he visited Havana
less than a year later, on March 21-22, 2016. These steps were the sine qua non for a whole
host of political, bureaucratic and commercial measures aimed at enlarging the emerging
constituencies for change.
9 The  governments  quickly  started  working  on  issues  such  as  law  enforcement,
counternarcotics, civil aviation, environmental protection, and trafficking in persons. A
series of regulatory changes following the December 17th announcement were enacted by
the Departments of Treasury and Commerce the following months, and included new
measures facilitating travel, financial transactions, the flow of remittances, commercial
sales and exports of certain goods, and telecommunications services between the two
countries (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015a, 2015b). The White House decided to
address  the  unresolved  maritime  boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  accept  Cuba’s
participation in the 2015 Summit of Americas, and review Cuba’s designation as a so-
called “state sponsor of terrorism,” which was subsequently rescinded on May 29, 2015
(Hirschfeld Davis J., 2015). In the ensuing 18 months, the two governments signed several
agreements to collaborate on various topics, including health, the environment, drug and
human trafficking, and telecommunications.
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10 In sum, without the consent of Congress, Obama was able to end fifty-five years of hostile
diplomatic  relations,  declare  the  end  of  “regime change”  as  the  goal  of  U.S.  policy,
establish bilateral commissions to tackle shared issues, and facilitate expanded travel and
remittances between the peoples of Cuba and the United States (Kopetski M., 2016 :347).
Although the White House was unable to rally enough congressional support to lift the
embargo,  it  effectively  utilized  the  president’s  executive  powers  to  weaken it,  while
building bipartisan momentum for its ultimate termination.
11 That strategy, however, hit a major roadblock in November 2016 when Donald Trump
unexpectedly  beat  Hillary  Clinton  to  win  the  White  House.  President  Trump is  now
wielding his  executive powers to reverse course.  Trump’s  June 2017 executive order,
referred to as the Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United
States Toward Cuba, (White House, 2017b) supersedes and replaces Obama’s October 14,
2016 executive order, referred to as the Presidential Policy Directive on United States-
Cuba  Normalization (White  House,  2016).  The  Trump memorandum expresses  strong
support for the economic embargo of Cuba and opposes any measures that call for its end,
including by the United Nations and other international forums.
12 The limited scope of his policy changes to date, however, suggests Trump’s approach may
be more talk than action. Trump’s order outlined three main steps to strengthen the
embargo. First, new rules would ban individual “people-to-people” visits to Cuba, making
it  mandatory  for  U.S.  travelers  in  that  category  to  travel  in  groups  with  licensed
providers. Second, the new rules would prohibit direct financial transactions that would
“disproportionately  benefit”  entities  under  the  control  of  the  “Cuban  military,
intelligence,  or  security  services  or  personnel  (such  as  Grupo  de  Administración
Empresarial  S.A.  (GAESA),  its  affiliates,  subsidiaries,  and  successors),”  and  requires
travelers to keep detailed records of their transactions for potential review by the State
Department. The Secretary of State has been directed to publish a list of these entities,
which occurred in November 2017 (U.S.  Department of  State,  2017).  Third,  the order
prohibits transactions with a much longer list of individuals associated with the Cuban
government to include members of Cuba’s national assembly, judiciary, state media, labor
unions and all members of the military, police and intelligence agencies, not just their
leadership. 
13 Trump’s measures are not as onerous as anticipated, and certainly do not amount to
“canceling the last administration's completely one-sided deal with Cuba,” as he stated in
his Miami remarks in June 2017 to an ecstatic crowd of pro-embargo exiles gathered at a
theater dedicated to one of the fallen “heroes” of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1962
(White  House  2017c).  They  do  not,  for  example,  impose  any  restrictions  on  Cuban-
American  family  travel  and  remittances,  put  Cuba  back  on  the  State  Department’s
terrorism list,  close  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Havana,  restrict  the  11  other  categories  of
permitted travel,  or  reinstate the “wet foot,  dry foot” policy that  encouraged Cuban
migrants to take dangerous routes in their attempts to reach U.S. soil (LeoGrande W.,
2017). Diplomatic relations were preserved, although not without some harm. 
14 While Obama’s policy directive stated “we are not seeking to impose regime change on
Cuba; we are instead…respecting that it is up to the Cuban people to make their own
choices about their future,” Trump’s policy reverts to the regime change doctrine by
reinforcing the basic terms of the embargo as codified by Congress in 1996. It aims “to
improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise,
and promote democracy in Cuba” (Miller A. and T. Piccone, 2016 :301-318)1 and ultimately
U.S.-Cuba Normalization: U.S. Constituencies for Change
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
4
“to promote a stable, prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people...” He states that
his Administration’s policy “will be guided by the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people,” asserting that
the Cuban people have the same ideas about sovereignty and human rights as Americans
(Miller A. and T. Piccone, 2016, op. cit.)2. Nonetheless, the policy measures he espouses are
likely to hurt Cuban citizens, particularly those in the burgeoning private sector that
have benefited from a big jump in U.S. travelers (Leogrande W. and R. Newfarmer, 2017;
Berkeley Cohen H. and A. Ahmed, 2017)3 and civil society activists trying through various
means to contest one-party rule on the island.
 
Economic and Trade Ties
15 One of the most important U.S. sectors driving the call for normalization with Cuba has
been the U.S. business community. There are at least three key elements of this coalition:
1)  the  agricultural  industry;  2)  the  travel  and  hospitality  industry;  and  3)  the
telecommunications and internet sector. Companies in the fields of health and medicine,
construction  materials  and professional  services  were  also  engaged,  though more  as
secondary players. 
16 Working sectorally and in combination through such newly formed groups as the U.S.-
Cuba Business Council, an arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (which has long opposed
the embargo), the U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba, and the Cuban Consortium4, these
companies and their advisors have sought to position themselves on the inside track for
business opportunities in Cuba in the short and medium term. Given the comprehensive
and complex nature of the U.S. embargo, they understood the need to press urgently for
regulatory relief to explore, let alone negotiate, commercial deals on the island. Some of
these companies also sought congressional action, for example to lift the restriction on
private financing for agricultural exports or to end the prohibition on tourist travel to
Cuba. 
17 A two-pronged strategy evolved: first get the White House and relevant agencies to ease
the embargo’s  rules  on commercial  and trade transactions  as  much as  possible,  and
second (and simultaneously) lobby the Congress to loosen the embargo in pieces, if not
wholesale. A coalition of like-minded pro-normalization constituencies at the national
and local levels organized under the banner of Engage Cuba5, to push for congressional
action to  lift  the  embargo.  Pro-normalization Cuban-American business  leaders,  who
played  a  critical  role  in  Obama’s  first  term to  convince  the  White  House  and  State
Department to stick with the strategy of rapprochement, continued to have an important
voice in specific cases and transactions. But to date they have been unable to persuade
their senators and representatives in Congress and in Florida and New Jersey to back off
their traditional hardline, pro-embargo approach.
18 Making the case to allow U.S. businesses to compete in Cuba’s slowly liberalizing economy
made a lot of sense politically, especially given the important ties between the corporate
sector and the Republican party. But it did not suffice legally given the onerous strictures
of the embargo law itself. In order for the president to justify easing the embargo, he had
to draft the regulatory amendments in a way that principally benefited the Cuban people,
particularly private farmers and the nascent private sector engaged in self-employment
activities in Cuba’s rapidly expanding tourism industry. 
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19 It  is in this context that one should understand the most important regulatory steps
taken after  the D17 breakthrough.  President  Obama outlined key regulatory changes
designed  to  increase  “the  speed,  efficiency,  and oversight  of  authorized  payments
between the United States and Cuba.” The changes initially covered a wide range of
sectors including:
• Expanding exports of commercial goods and services to Cuba to provide lower-priced goods
to Cubans; 
• Altering banking regulations to allow U.S. institutions to open accounts at Cuban financial
institutions to facilitate transactions between the countries, and authorizing U.S. credit and
debit cards for use by travelers in Cuba;
• Allowing the commercial export of certain communication items to increase Cubans’ ability
to communicate more easily with people in the United States and the rest of the world.
20 Following  this  presidential  directive,  the  Departments  of  Treasury  and  Commerce
instituted a series of regulatory changes split into five packages from January 2015 to
October 2016. The series included changes for sectors already exempted (partially) from
the  embargo  and  most  likely  to  benefit  from  the  early  phase  of  normalization  -
agricultural  trade,  non-tourist  travel  and  hospitality,  and  telecommunications;  in
addition,  important  changes  were  made  to  ease  export  and  import rules,  banking
transactions, and remittances policies.
 
Travel and Hospitality
21 The  Obama  administration  moved  quickly  to  liberalize  permitted  travel  to  Cuba  by
expanding legal justifications in the 12 categories of licensed travel, including the broad
“people to people” category frequently used by U.S. travelers. On December 17, 2015, the
one-year anniversary of President Obama’s announcement, the two countries agreed to
start commercial flights (Oppmann P. and R. Marsh, 2016)6. U.S. airlines now negotiate
directly  with  the  Cuban  government  to  plan  and  maintain  routes  to  the  island.
Establishing direct flights has brought thousands of daily visitors to Cuba and helped spur
bilateral economic relations across a range of related sectors including private and public
transportation, retail, food services, hospitality, travel services, and air traffic control.
22 The  U.S.-based  cruise  industry  also  has  jumped  at  the  chance  of  expanding  their
Caribbean  routes  to  include  long-forbidden  Cuban  ports  of  call  on  their  itineraries.
Roughly 140 commercial cruises are scheduled to visit Cuban ports in 2017 from both
large and mid-sized U.S. cruise companies, including major cruise lines such as Carnival,
Royal Caribbean, Norwegian and Regent Seven Seas (Engage Cuba, 2017). On May 2, 2016
Carnival Cruise Line’s Adonia ship became the first cruise ship to dock in Cuba in nearly
40 years. Carnival Cruise Line – a member of Engage Cuba’s Business Council – used its
Fathom brand to bring 704 passengers under a “people-to-people” travel license (CBS/AP,
2017). In the related hospitality industry, companies like Starwood and Marriott (now
merged) and Airbnb (Noticias Telemundo, 2017)7. were early out of the gates in working
under the new rules to obtain special U.S. licenses to reach agreements with relevant
Cuban ministries to manage hotels and bookings in private Cuban homes.
23 Since these travel-related rules were changed, the number of U.S. travelers to the island
has continued to climb. According to Cuba’s National Office of Statistics and Information,
Cuba welcomed 284,937 Americans in 2016, an increase of 74 percent from the prior year.
U.S.-Cuba Normalization: U.S. Constituencies for Change
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
6
By the end of May 2017, the island had already welcomed 284,565 U.S. visitors (these
numbers do not include members of the Cuban diaspora living in the United States, which
separately increased 45 percent compared to the same period the year earlier). If the rate
of American tourism to Cuba continues apace through the year, it will represent a 145%
increase over 2016 (Cuba Debate, 2017).
 
Agricultural Trade
24 While the U.S. agriculture industry is already permitted under the embargo to export
food  commodities  to  Cuba,  it  is  prohibited  by  Congress  from  doing  so  on  credit;
restrictions on ships entering U.S. ports from Cuba pose another legislative roadblock to
expanding bilateral trade. As a result, Cuba’s food imports from U.S. companies steadily
dropped from a high of over $700 million a year in 2008 to just $232 million in 2016 (U.S.-
Cuba Trade and Economic Council, 2017). Obama inserted some slight flexibility to the
rules but only Congress can actually fix the underlying problem.
25 There have been growing bipartisan efforts in Congress to address this  hindrance to
increasing  agricultural  exports  to  Cuba  given  the  potential  benefits  for  American
companies  across  multiple  states.  In  September  2015,  Republican  Governor  Asa
Hutchinson of Arkansas, which has suffered from falling sales of poultry and rice, asked
Congress to lift restrictions preventing U.S. food companies from selling to Cuba on credit
(Trotta D.,  2015).  In October of 2015, nine governors from Alabama, California, Idaho,
Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Washington wrote letters to
congressional leadership highlighting the harm that the embargo has done to American
agriculture exports. The letter stated that trade restrictions stifle job creation in rural
areas and "ending the embargo will create jobs here at home, especially in rural America,
and  will  create  new  opportunities  for  U.S.  agriculture."  It  went  on  to  state  that
"expanding trade with Cuba will further strengthen our nation's agriculture sector by
opening a market of 11 million people just 90 miles from our shores, and continue to
maintain the tremendous momentum of U.S. agricultural exports, which reached a record
$152 billion in 2014,” (Koplowitz H., 2015).
26 These arguments helped build some momentum in Congress to take action. On December
16,  2015,  the U.S.  House of  Representatives formed the bipartisan with 10 bipartisan
members of Congress representing districts with a wide array of industries, including
agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism, that would benefit from business relations with
Cuba (Toosi N., 2015; U.S. House of Representatives Cuba Working Group, 2015). Many
Republican lawmakers have visited Cuba and support lifting the embargo for economic
reasons.  For example,  Republican Governor of  Texas Greg Abbott,  following a trip to
Cuba,  publicly  supported  efforts  to  engage  in  bilateral  trade,  particularly  in  the
agricultural sector (KVUE, 2015). Bipartisan efforts in the House and Senate, principally
from farm states, to allow private financing for agricultural sales and to remove the six-
month restriction on ships traveling from Cuba failed, however, to gain a vote due to
opposition  from  the  House  and  Senate  Republican  leadership  (Zengerle  P.  and  M.
Spetalnick, 2015; Jansen B., 2016).
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Telecommunications Changes
27 The telecommunications sector, while permitted under certain conditions to do business
in  Cuba,  was  hindered  by  onerous  regulations  that  took  a  narrow interpretation  of
Congress’ prohibition of “investment” in Cuba’s telecommunications “infrastructure” (
Piccone T. et al., 2010). This changed after D17. The Treasury Department instituted a new
OFAC general license to facilitate the establishment of commercial telecommunications
facilities linking third countries and Cuba and authorized additional services incident to
internet-based communications and related to certain exportations and reexportations of
communications  items.  Obama’s  Commerce  Department  created  a  Consumer
Communication Devices (CCD) license exception to authorize “commercial sales, as well
as  donations,  of  the  export  and  reexport  of  consumer  communications  devices  that
enable the flow of information to from and among the Cuban people – such as personal
computers, mobile phones, televisions, memory devices, recording devices, and consumer
software” instead of requiring licenses. On September 21, 2015, further changes went into
effect that removed the limitation on License Exceptions for Consumer Communications
Devices (CCD) to support other types of transactions, such as leases and loans of eligible
items for use by eligible end-users (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015b).8
28 These revisions also allowed U.S. businesses providing telecommunications and internet-
based services to establish themselves in Cuba and enter into joint ventures with Cuban
entities. The first of these joint ventures was between Sprint and the Cuban state-owned
telecommunications  company  ETECSA  (Schwartz  F.,  2015).  Verizon  Wireless  began
offering roaming service in Cuba shortly therafter, followed by AT&T and T-Mobile. In
2015, the two countries also established direct calling capability for the first time in 15
years. In addition, U.S. technology leader Google negotiated an arrangement with ETECSA
to allow for faster and easier access to its services. Snail mail is back in service too. On
March 15, 2016, direct mail service between the U.S. and Cuba resumed with President
Obama’s letter to a 76-year-old Cuban woman among the first batches of mail (Stanglin D.,
2016).  The  U.S.  Postal  Service  now offers  full-range  services  and other  U.S.  delivery
service companies like UPS and DHL are negotiating to get on the island.
 
Banking Changes
29 One of the most important commercial sectors that has been the most reluctant to engage
in Cuba is the banking and finance industry. Painful penalties imposed on U.S. and foreign
banks  by  Treasury  Department’s  OFAC  for  violating  the  embargo  have  left  bitter
reminders of the risks entailed in financing transactions between U.S. and even third
country entities and Cuba. 
30 Obama era regulatory changes to banking policy permitted depository institutions to
open and maintain correspondent accounts at a Cuban financial institution to facilitate
the processing of authorized transactions, and authorized U.S. financial institutions to
enroll merchants and process credit and debit card transactions for travel-related and
other  transactions.  The  changes  also  permitted  banking  institutions,  including  U.S.-
registered brokers or dealers in securities and U.S.-registered money transmitters,  to
process authorized remittances to Cuba under an expanded general license.
U.S.-Cuba Normalization: U.S. Constituencies for Change
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
8
31 The wider changes announced September 18, 2015 allowed some Americans to establish
bank accounts and offices in Cuba, employ Cuban nationals and hire persons subject to
U.S.  jurisdiction in Cuba (Schwartz F.,  2015,  op.  cit.).  The fourth round of  regulatory
changes in March 2016 allowed Cubans to open bank accounts in the U.S.  They also
allowed “U-turn transactions”, where money from Cuba or a Cuban citizen can be cleared
through a U.S.  bank and transferred back in dollars.  Treasury also allowed American
banks to process dollar-denominated transactions from Cuba, and to open accounts for
Cubans that they could use to receive payment in the United States and send money back
to  Cuba  (Hirschfeld  Davis  J.,  2016).  In  response  to  growing  demand  from  U.S.
pharmaceutical  and  medical  research  entities  to  partner  with  Cuba’s  biotechnology
industry, the October 2016 round of Obama era regulations enabled persons engaged in
joint medical research or transactions involving Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals to open
and maintain bank accounts in Cuba (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016). Despite
these changes, the banking industry remains mostly on the sidelines, which is further
hampering a host of transactions between the two countries.
 
Remittances Changes
32 From the start of the Obama administration, the White House supported steps to ease the
flow  of  U.S.  remittances  to  Cuban  families  on  the  island,  which  has  become  an
increasingly important source of income for a large number of Cuban citizens. This was a
popular  move  among  the  Cuban  exile  community  in  Florida  and  elsewhere;  it  also
benefits  U.S.  money  transfer  companies,  which  charge  an  average  of  8  percent
commission on wire transfers to Cuba, generating up to $320 million in annual revenue
for these companies (Engage Cuba, 2017). 
33 Beginning in 2009,  the Treasury Department,  under Obama’s  direction,  incrementally
removed  limits  on  remittances  through  multiple  amendments  to  the  Cuban  Assets
Control  Regulations  (CACR).  Following  the  January  15,  2015  announcement,  the
Department of Treasury and Commerce lessened limits on generally licensed remittances
to  Cuban  nationals  (other  than  certain  prohibited  Cuban  government  and  Cuban
Communist Party officials) from $500 to $2,000 per quarter, allowed “certain remittances
to  Cuban  nationals  for  humanitarian  projects,  support  for  the Cuban  people,  or
development of private businesses” without limitation9, and allowed travelers to carry
$10,000  to  Cuba  “in  total  family  remittances,  periodic  remittances,  remittances  to
religious  organizations in Cuba,  and remittances  to students  in Cuba pursuant  to  an
educational  license.”  The  September  15,  2015  amendment  lifted  the  dollar  limits
altogether on donative remittances and amounts travelers may take to Cuba10. Loosening
limits on remittances allowed relatives to send money to Cuba to start small businesses or
to cover their family members’ migration costs (Morales E., 2017).
 
Migration
34 One of the longstanding areas of contention between Cuba and the United States, and
within the U.S. political arena, is migration. Ever since Fidel Castro opened the gates in
1980 to over 125,000 Cuban emigrants seeking passage to the United States, including
many from Cuban prisons and mental health institutions, the question of how to manage
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the  mix  of  political  asylees  and  economic  migrants  confounded  policymakers  and
scrambled  politics  in  the  Cuban diaspora.  Some  constituencies  chafed  at  the  special
privileges afforded only to Cubans who could declare asylum the moment the stepped
foot on U.S. soil and begin receiving special welfare assistance. Even anti-Castro factions
in Cuba grew tired of the system’s growing exploitation by Cubans posing as political
refugees  but  more  interested in  securing  easy  access  to  a  U.S.  green card  and then
traveling back and forth to Cuba. In 2016, with the acrimonious political debate in the
United States trending increasingly against immigration, these forces coalesced in favor
of ending the special privileges granted to Cuban migrants.
35 Knowing  that  the  Obama  administration’s  efforts  at  normalization  jeopardized  their
preferential immigration status, an increasing number of Cuban migrants attempted to
gain access to the United States after D17. The Migration Policy Institute reported that
after several years of reduced entries, “the number crossing the U.S.-Mexico border after
a long, often treacherous journey rose from about 31,000 in 2015 to roughly 38,500 in
2016… [and] the number of Cuban rafters interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard jumped
from 4,500 in 2015 to 7,400 in 2016,” (Duany J., 2017).
36 These fears were not unfounded. On January 12, 2017, after months of negotiations with
the  Cuban government,  President  Obama revoked the  preferential  wet  foot/dry  foot
policy,  which  granted  automatic  entry  to  any  Cuban  citizen  who  was  able  to  reach
American soil. The visa lottery allowing 20,000 Cubans to enter the country legally each
year was not changed. In his statement, Obama argued that “by taking this step, we are
treating Cuban migrants the same way we treat migrants from other countries (White
House, 2017a); other administration officials highlighted the move as an important step
in combatting human trafficking (Caldwell A. and J. Pace, 2017). President Trump, who
campaigned on a  platform of  cutting down both legal  and illegal  migration,  did not
object.  Nor did Cuban-American legislators  in Florida who,  fearing a  loss  of  political
support from newly arrived migrants who did not share their strong anti-Castro views,
had sponsored legislation to close the loopholes in 2016. The first deportations of non-
visa Cuban immigrants under the new policy took place under the Trump administration
a month later on February 17 (Gámez Torres, N., 2017).
37 The effect of  the policy change was visible immediately.  While the number of Cuban
“inadmissables”  intercepted  by  US  Customs  and  Border  Protection  at  the  Southwest
border rose significantly from 17,109 to 28,642 to 41,523 from FY2014-16, that number
plummeted to  14,592  in  FY2017 (October  2016 to  June  30,  2016)  with  only  806  after
January 2017 (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2017).
38 President Trump is unlikely to reverse this change in policy because it would undermine
his strong position against illegal immigration. Any mention of it was noticeably absent
from his Cuba announcement in June, and Senator Rubio, one of the architects of Trump’s
new policy, has been outspoken in his opinion that the policy was flawed and frequently
abused by Cubans travelling back and forth from the United States to the island (Mazzei
P. et al., 2017).
 
Property Claims
39 One issue that has bedeviled U.S.-Cuba relations is property claims by American citizens
and corporations for  the loss  of  their  property after  the Castro regime expropriated
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hundreds of farms, factories and family estates shortly after the revolution. While many
corporations long ago wrote off these claims as a loss, others hope that one day they
could  get  some  type  of  preferential  access  to  the  Cuban  market,  if  not  meaningful
compensation. Many other Americans, however, retain strong emotional connections to
their  lost  properties  and  demand  adequate  compensation,  with  interest,  if  not  full
restitution of the properties themselves. Another class of claimants – Cuban Americans
who  were  not  U.S.  nationals  at  the  time  of  the  taking  and  left  the  island  after
expropriation – have pursued their claims against Cuba in U.S. courts and/or lobbied U.S.
and Cuban government officials to seek compensation (Feinberg R., 2015 :18).11 Together,
these groups offered a potentially powerful constituency in the United States in favor of
normalization.
40 After Obama’s D17 announcement renewing diplomatic relations, the two governments
established  a  bilateral  working  group  to  address  the  nearly  6,000  certified  property
claims valued by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission at  $1.9 billion.  If  simple
interest  of  six percent per annum were included,  that  valuation jumps to $8 billion.
Congress authorized these claims without identifying funds to pay them and signaled it
did not intend to pay them (Feinberg R., 2015, op. cit. p 2.). Some question whether the
Cuban government would ever be willing or able to provide adequate compensation to
the claimants. Three bilateral talks on these claims have occurred thus far; however, none
has been resolved and the process appears dormant.
41 As a sign of the ongoing political and economic interest in settling these claims, Senators
Marco Rubio and Bill  Nelson of  Florida sent  a  letter as  recently as  June 2017 to the
secretaries of State and Treasury asking them to work with Congress “to develop a plan
and timeline for resolution of these claims, as well as consider instructing the FCSC to
conduct  a  third Cuban Claims Program to allow for  potential  new claimants.”  While
Trump may have no interest in ending the embargo, he may be interested in resolving
U.S.-Cuban claims in order to address  the legitimate demands of  a  business  class  he
represents. It was the Trump Organization, after all, that sent senior representatives to
the  island as  recently  as  late  2012  to  explore  potential  hotel  and golf  opportunities
(Drucker J. and S. Wicary, 2016). To avoid further complicating the issue, and preserve
options for resumption of talks, President Trump announced the suspension of Title III of
the  Helms-Burton  embargo  law and  indicated  to  Congress  that  the  suspensions  will
continue (Whitefield M., 2017).12 If ever given effect, Title III would allow former owners
of commercial property expropriated by Cuba to sue foreign companies "trafficking" in
those confiscated holdings. 
 
Conclusion
42 This brief review of the U.S. constituencies favoring normalization between the United
States  and  Cuba  demonstrates  the  complex  interaction  between  domestic  politics,
economic interests and foreign policy. It does not even begin to address, however, the
even more complex relationship between these factors and Cuba’s sovereign decisions on
how to manage its national economy, politics and foreign policy. Nonetheless, given the
decades of control that the Cuban diaspora has had on U.S. policy toward the island, and
its resurgence under the Trump administration, it is clear that the momentum in favor of
normalization on the U.S. side has taken a direct hit. Trump’s proclamations at the UN
General Assembly in September further underscored his decision to leave the embargo
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untouched until “the corrupt, destabilizing regime in Cuba” makes fundamental reforms.
These latest setbacks, however, are not fatal. As the Cuban exile leadership in the United
States  ages  and  mellows,  wholesale  opposition  to  rapprochement  has  declined,  as
indicated by the relatively soft measures announced by Trump in Miami in June 2017.
Meanwhile, the constituencies in favor of normalization in both political parties have not
gone  away.  If  anything,  the  groups  that  have  rallied  for  President  Obama’s  historic
rapprochement towards Cuba have gotten stronger, more organized and better funded.
The horizon looks cloudy, but over time, trends portend gradual progress toward U.S.
entente with Cuba in the medium to long term.
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NOTES
1. The United States has a history of failed democracy promotion in Cuba, epitomized by USAID’s
Zunzuneo or “Cuban Twitter” program to provoke opposition to Fidel Castro’s regime through
social  media  and  resulting  in  Cuba  sentencing  USAID contractor,  Alan  Gross,  to  15  years  in
prison.
2. Cuba’s  history  of  Spanish  colonialism  planted  the  idea  that  political  participation  was
contingent on government favor, with the government as the primary source of authority.
3. The Cuban non-state  sector  –  private  bed and breakfasts  (casas  particulares),  restaurants,
taxis,  tour guides, etc. – receives about 31 percent of all tourist dollars. Many small business
entrepreneurs rely on the recent influx of Americans travelling to Cuba. American travelers are
more likely to use these services, particularly when traveling as individuals.
4. The author serves on its advisory board.
5. The author serves on its policy council.
6. JetBlue Flight 387 on August 31, 2016, was the first direct commercial flight between the U.S.
and Cuba in over half a century.
7. Since AirBnb came to Cuba in 2015, making it easier for Cubans to rent out their homes to
foreigners, the company has generated $40 million in income for self-employed Cubans. AirBnb
currently has 22,000 rooms for 70 cities and towns in Cuba.
8. The CCD export policy was also expanded to authorize services related to additional types of
items  authorized  by  Commerce,  and  to  add  training related  to  the  installation,  repair,  or
replacement of those items.
9. Americans  belonging  to  the  following  categories  were  permitted to  maintain  a  physical
presence  in  Cuba:  offices,  retail  outlets,  or  warehouses:  “news  bureaus;  exporters  of  certain
goods authorized for export or re-export to Cuba by Commerce and OFAC, such as agricultural
products  and materials  for  construction  or  renovation  of  privately-owned buildings;  entities
providing mail or parcel transmission services or certain cargo transportation services; providers
of telecommunications or internet-based services; entities organizing or conducting educational
activities; religious organizations; and providers of carrier and certain travel services.” 
10. These general licenses allow remittances for humanitarian projects in or related to Cuba that
are designed to directly benefit the Cuban people; to support the Cuban people through activities
of  recognized human rights  organizations,  independent organizations designed to promote a
rapid,  peaceful  transition  to  democracy,  and  activities  of  individuals  and  non-governmental
organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba;
and to support the development of private businesses, including small farms.
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11. There  are  actually  three  main  types  of  claims---certified  property  claims,  uncertified
property  claims,  and state  sponsor  of  terrorism claims--all  of  which put  a  burden U.S.-Cuba
relations and necessitate settlements. 
12. Title III of Helms-Burton allows the filing of claims against companies “trafficking” in areas
confiscated from Americans after the Cuban revolution and was designed to have a chilling effect
on foreign investment in Cuba. Every U.S. president since Bill Clinton has routinely suspended
the lawsuit provision every six months because letting the lawsuits go forward would alienate
important trading partners such as Canada and EU countries whose citizens have invested in
Cuba .
ABSTRACTS
The United States and Cuba made important strides after the re-launch of diplomatic relations
between the two countries under Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro in 2015-2016. These
changes were both psychological and symbolic as key themes of mutual respect, sovereignty and
reconciliation gained ground. They were also pragmatic, cutting across a wide range of issues
from travel and hospitality, which has helped catalyze a major increase in U.S. travelers to the
island,  to  telecommunications and migration.  These measures  reflected the emergence of  an
effective coalition of U.S. constituencies that organized individual and joint efforts to regain the
advantage over the traditional pro-embargo approach of the Cuban diaspora.
With  the  inauguration  of  Donald  Trump  in  January  2017,  however,  forward  momentum  in
bilateral  relations  has  nearly  ground  to  a  halt  as  the  hardline  Cuban  exile  community  has
reasserted primacy in shaping U.S. policy toward the island. Nonetheless, the Republican Party is
divided over how far to roll back the changes made by Obama as specific constituencies with the
most to gain from normalization defend their interests in continued normalization. The author
analyzes the various U.S. stakeholders pushing for relaxation of the embargo and how the Obama
administration’s policies benefited them. It will also look at the role of the U.S. Congress and the
prospects for rapprochement in the years ahead.
Les Etats-Unis et Cuba ont réalisé de grandes avancées dans leur relation après que les présidents
Barack  Obama  et  Raul  Castro  ont  renoué  les  relations  diplomatiques  en  2015-2016.  Ces
changements étaient à la fois d'ordre psychologique et symbolique alors que progressaient des
aspects aussi fondamentaux que le respect mutuel, la souveraineté et la réconciliation. Ils étaient
également d'ordre pragmatique, couvrant un large éventail de questions, telles que les voyages
ou  l'hébergement  —  contribuant  ainsi  à  catalyser  une  hausse  significative  du  nombre  de
voyageurs américains sur l'île— ou bien encore les télécommunications et la question migratoire.
Ces mesures ont reflété l'émergence d'une coalition de groupes d'intérêts américains qui ont
réussi à organiser les efforts individuels et collectifs pour prendre l'ascendant sur l'approche
traditionnellement favorable à l'embargo défendue par la diaspora cubaine.
Toutefois, avec l'entrée en focntions de Donald Trump en janvier 2017, toute avancée dans les
relations bilatérales est au point mort puisque la ligne dure de la communauté cubaine en exil est
redevenue  prépondérante  dans  la  politique  des  Etats-Unis  envers  l'île.  Cependant,  le  parti
républicain reste divisé sur ce qui doit être maintenu ou supprimé dans les changements opérés
par Obama car plusieurs groupes d'intérêts qui ont tout à gagner à la normalisation des relations
défendent âprement la poursuite du processus de normalisation. L'auteur analyse les différents
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secteurs américains favorables à un assouplissement de l'embargo et comment les mesures prises
par  l'Administration  Obama  ont  pu  leur  bénéficier.  Il  analyse  également  le  rôle  du  Congrès
américain et les perspectives de rapprochement dans les années à venir.
Durante 2015-2016, Cuba y los Estados Unidos hicieron zancadas muy importantes tras de la re-
lanza de las relaciones diplomáticos entre los dos países bajo Presidentes Barak Obama y Raul
Castro. Estos cambios fueron psicológicos y simbólicos a medida que avanzaban los temas claves
de respecto mutual,  soberanía,  y  reconciliación.  También eran pragmáticos,  atravesando una
amplia gama de temas de viajes y hospitalidad, lo que ha ayudado a catalizar un importante
aumento en los viajeros estadounidenses a la isla, a las telecomunicaciones ya la migración. Estas
medidas  reflejaban  la  aparición  de  una  coalición  efectiva  entre  unos  grupos  interesados
estadounidenses que organizaban fuerzas juntas e individuales para recuperar la ventaja sobre la
propuesta tradicional de la diáspora cubana que era pro embargo.
Sin embargo, tras de la toma de posesión de Donald Trump el enero de 2017, la comunidad de
exilios cubanos ha retomado el poder de influir las políticas estadounidenses con respecto a la
isla, y el impulso hacia adelante para con las relaciones bilaterales ha parado. Al mismo tiempo,
el partido republicano está dividido en sus opiniones en cuánto debería revertir la normalización
cuando  grupos  específicos  con  lo  más  para  ganar  continúan  a  defender  sus  intereses  en  la
normalización. El autor analiza los varias partes interesadas quienes están empujando por una
relajación del embargo y como las políticas de la administración de Obama les beneficiaron. El
artículo  también  analiza  el  papel  del  congreso  estadounidense  y  las  posibilidades  para
rapprochement en los años que vienen.
INDEX
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